A group of FSB agents checked the wives of the Ukrainian military for $ 1.3 million .. (Part 2)

Recall that in the first part of the publication It was about the life history of the Ukrainian woman, the wife of a captive military of the Armed Forces, who searched the missing man on her own, however, got into the workshop and cynical trap of a group of agents of the FSB of the Russian Federation.

In the continuation of the material, we will tell you about the details of this story.

So, after the fact of the husband of Maria was established in captivity, she appealed to the coordination headquarters on the management of prisoners of war at GUR MOU, provided all the available information and began to wait for the news about further exchange. However, as we have previously appointed, this process is quite sensitive, depends on many factors, and therefore slow. This is what the fraudsters used to be discussed.

Thus, in particular, the coordination work on the Ukrainian side is the above coordination headquarters, in turn, from Russia, these functions performs a similar unit of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the GRU of the Russian Federation. It is this unit that forms lists of Ukrainian prisoners of war, flies them on “importance”, coordinates the work on “filtration”, collecting information and further exchange. So – has all the information about every Ukrainian prisoner of war, his family members, residence addresses in Ukraine, personal data, etc.

Considering such functionality and the large amount of sensitive information, the decision was made to implement a cynical and fraudulent scheme to seize the funds of families of Ukrainian prisoners of war, promising rather than their release from captivity. The scheme began to be implemented in cooperation with the relevant FSB unit of the Russian Federation and with the involvement of the agent network.

Yes, on the example of our Mary, the fraudulent equipment acted as follows:

1. “Coordination Headquarters for the exchange of prisoners” of the Russian Federation formed the relevant databases of Ukrainian prisoners of war and sent information to the relevant FSB unit of the Russian Federation;
2. The “relevant unit” of the FSB of the Russian Federation identified relatives of Ukrainian prisoners of war and methods of establishing communication with them;
3. The resident of the FSB of the Russian Federation received the technical task of implementing the scheme with data from the relatives of prisoners of war and distributed functional tasks among the participants of the agent network;
4. The participants of the agent network established contacts with relatives of prisoners and act in deliberately created the conditions for seizing the victims in exchange for the promise to promote faster release of the prisoners;
5. Participants of the agent network provided in advance prepared details of foreign bank cards, seized with funds with their apparent output to the territory of the Russian Federation.

Detailing the implementation of the specified scheme on the example of the victim, which appealed to our version, after the latter appealed to the coordination headquarters on the management of prisoners of war at GUR MOU and began to expect the news about the possible exchange of her husband, for her connection with her, it came out. Previously, a person named Alexander (on the appropriate thematic forum on the Internet), which was presented by a Russian volunteer, who is not indifferent to the fate of Ukrainians and termination of bloodshed. Alexander told Maria about his opportunities to accelerate the exchange, called all the passport data of Mary and her husband and also provided a photo of her husband. A similar awareness of a stranger about the circumstances of the case has caused a sense of trust in Mary and became the basis for the further implementation of the criminal scheme.

Subsequently, Alexander’s above said that the issue with the exchange could be guaranteed positively, but for a cash remuneration of $ 5,000,000.

This information was embarrassed by Mary, because the sum is great, but gave up certain hopes, since the person who called Alexander promised a guarantee, as well as an online meeting with the coordinator of the Volunteer Movement.

Further, about two weeks, after the first conversation with Alexander, a ZOOM was held in Maria – a conference with Alexander and the “coordinator”, which introduced himself, told Maria about the procedure for organizing the exchange, gave details of the account to pay the above amount and formed the relevant “guarantees”. About a week, after this conversation, Maria transferred $ 5,000,000 to her accounts. Subsequently, Alexander and the “coordinator” ceased to communicate and Maria realized that she became a victim of a fraudulent scheme.

The deceived woman sought help from journalists – investigators who identified interesting facts about participants in the agent network and found many victims who were cheated under a similar scheme for a total amount of about $ 1.3 million. The victims are already giving appropriate impressions.

Thus, according to the data that journalists were established during their own investigation, it was found that the said Special Operation of the FSB of the Russian Federation was involved in Russia. In particular:

1. Applying specialized computer programs to identify individuals on the Internet, it is likely to establish that a person represented by a “coordinator”, provided settlement accounts for payments and acceptance of money for seemingly “accelerating the exchange of Ukrainian prisoners of war” – Gutnov Soslan RuslanovichOn January 11, 1979, a native of Vladikavkaz, who lives in Vienna, Austria.

1. “Russian volunteer” named Alexander can be a citizen of the Russian Federation – Alexander Konstantinovich Konankin, 06.12.1989 born suspected by US authorities of extorting a significant amount of funds from US citizen Kyle Nagi But at the same time, it is an active agent of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Place of residence – Dubai, UAE;

1. Accounts used to implement a special fraudulent operation provide for both cryptocurrency transactions and Fiat using Kazakh financial and banking institutions, namely:

70098478234818; 70098485144419; 5521752501581511; 559492702612626; 5521862554359622; 712403900255455249; 559332700757595; 4790876912865838; 559332700772487; 70098489074100; 5211786644797878; 4779646916753057; 559572055966537; 7008455869849; 559332706583532; 4390776412525896; 559332700945547; 5521756777706405; 559332700567705; 4261012553805871; 6762306922707134; 1000012537555776; 5521756777272382,40817810004700000908; 40817810805770907353; 40817840706120002689; 40817810204010136883.

In addition, cryptocurrency wallets:

Twnrha9vabcycwuq5tyuppmpiPoor9n, tsjdgbknt1xnqctapegtgvjnkbkjpgka3, tmfahforwjwwwjrzen844gmr6rgjqqqqqqqkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk 7p, TEMLSDAXSNUBVVUV8WYLANKOVQZC21RR7A, TBQ8MZMYHKUYKHUFWTRNSIQRNCRNcrXWCGO

It is obvious that journalists and indifferent persons conducted a tremendous volume of work, which will allow domestic law enforcement officers to establish a complete, comprehensive and objective truth in a given resonant case, to protect the rights and freedoms of deceived citizens of Ukraine and to hold all the guilty.